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ABSTRACT
As per capita water supplies in many regions of the United States
and the world begin to decrease, a mechanism must evolve to
transfer water to where it is needed. Water markets have become
increasingly popular with water managers and state officials as a
means of allocating or reallocating this resource. Along the Rio
Grande in Texas, a spot market for water has developed that is very
active, with all the attributes that a well-defined market should
show. As a result, individuals from agriculture, municipalities, and
industry have begun to rely on this market as a means to supple-
ment shortfalls in their own supply.
INTRODUCTION
Markets are one of the means of allocating scarce resources among
competing uses. The idea of markets as a mechanism for transferring water
to its highest valued use has been forwarded by economists for some time.1
From this view, markets that are competitive can allocate the resource
effectively and have increasingly become a management component for
local and regional water systems. As the demand for water increases and
the per capita supplies for many regions not only in the United States but
also around the world decreases, these markets can play a role in helping
to alleviate the pressures of the increased demand.
The purpose of this article is to examine the recent activity in the
spot market for water along the Rio Grande in Texas.' Both positive
characteristics, which water managers may want to include in the
development of their own markets, and negative characteristics, which they
* Department of Economics and Finance, Texas A&M International University.
1. See generally Charles Howe et al., Innovative Approaches to Water Allocation: The
Potential for Water Markets, 22 WATER RESOURCES RS. 439-45 (1986); BONNIE C. SAIDA & DAVID
B. BusH, WATR MAMIIN THEORY AND PRAC1nCE MARKEr TRAsms, WATER VALUES AND
PuBuC PoLIcy (1987); Bonnie Colby, Transaction Costs and Efficiency in Western Water Allocation,
AMER. J. OF AGRIC. ECON. (1990).
2. The section of the Rio Grande that this study is concerned with is the area
administered by the Rio Grande Watermaster, which is the Amistad and Falc6n reservoir
system.
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may want to avoid, are identified. To better understand the development
of this spot market, an overview of the development of current water law
in the state of Texas, along with the geographic and economic features of
the region, will be presented.
FOUNDATIONS OF THE MARKET
Texas surface water, in contrast to underground water, is highly
regulated. Texas surface water law and water rights evolved through a
dual system, incorporating Spanish appropriation rights and English
common law, which emphasized riparian rights. This dual system in Texas
remained through the 1950s when drought conditions prevailed and total
claimed water rights under the dual system exceeded available water
supply. A 1956 court case led to the adjudication of Texas water rights on
a case by case basis.3 As a result of this case, the Texas legislature brought
about the merger of all riparian and appropriation water claims and
established a procedure to resolve the claims and acquire new permits or
transfer claims.' This legislation, the Texas Water Rights Adjudication Act
of 1967,1 also created the watermaster program to administer, monitor and
enforce water rights in the state. Along the Rio Grande this is the Rio
Grande Watermaster (RGW) Office, a part of the Texas Natural Resource
and Conservation Commission (TNRCC).
The Lower Rio Grande Valley Water Case6 determined the water
right allocation for each claimant and the priority of each water right.
Essentially, municipal and domestic users receive top priority, followed by
industrial users. Irrigation users rank third, although they have the single
largest allocation as a group.7 The amount of water that may be applied to
the beneficial use of agriculture was determined by the courts to be 2.5
acre-feet of water per acre of land per year.
Further decisions were made concerning water users. Class A
water rights embrace those entities who acquired rights to use the Rio
Grande by virtue of having complied with the appropriation statutes of the
state of Texas or whose water rights were recognized by the state (i.e.,
certified filings). Class B water rights embrace those who have been making
3. See Toas v. Hidalgo County Water Conservation and Irrigation Dist, 443 S.W.2d 728
(Tex. Ct. App. 1%9).
4. See Otis W. Templer, The Evaluation of Texas Water Law and the Impact of Adjudication,
17 WATER RESOURCES BULL 789 (1981); RONALD KAISER, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS WATER
LAW: PROBLEMS AND NEEDS 19 (1987).
5. TEXASWATER CODE ANN. § 11.301 (West 1998).
6. See supra text accompanying note 2.
7. See Andrew Schoolmaster, Water Marketing and Water Rights Transfers in the Lower Rio
Grande Valley, Texas, 43 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 292,296 (1991).
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"good faith" beneficial use of the waters of the Rio Grande for irrigation
purposes prior to the institution of the lawsuit (1956). Class A water rights
are allocated at a rate 1.7 times greater than Class B water rights.
This distinction is important since actual water rights do not
necessarily mean this is the quantity allocated to individual irrigators each
year. Some pro rata share is allocated depending on climatic conditions,
storage levels at various dams, and Rio Grande basin inflows. For example,
between 1978 and 1985 agricultural water rights holders received an
average of 41 percent of their total allotment.8
As of September 1997 there were 813 active water rights along the
entire Texas Rio Grande." By class of user, irrigation districts and individ-
ual irrigators represent the largest number of users. They hold 35 percent
of the total water rights when hydroelectric water rights are included and
86 percent of water rights when hydroelectric is excluded. Municipal water
rights holders represent 10 percent of claims to the Rio Grande when
excluding hydroelectric. Mining rights make up around one percent of the
total rights. There also exists a very small number of in-stream water rights
for wildlife and environmental purposes. Figure 1 shows the breakdown
of active water rights by class for the major participants in the spot market.
Figure 1
Active Water Rights
other
3%
municipal
Irrigators 10% mining
86% 1%
8. See Ric Jensen, The Texas Water Market, 13 TEL WATER RESOURCES, Spring 1987, at 1
(Tex. Water Resources Inst., College Station, Tex.).
9. See Telephone Interview with Tex. Nat. Resources Conservation Comm'n (Sept. 1997).
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Water use patterns in the United States and Mexico are similar, and
demand for water along the border is increasing. The United States
irrigates about 900,000 acres in the entire Rio Grande basin (versus 1.1
million acres in Mexico). Population growth along the border has also
increased. During the 1980s, the United States' population increased 27
percent (from 1.13 to 1.55 million persons) along the Rio Grande, compared
to 23 percent in Mexico."0 Supply availability of surface and groundwater
is compounded by water quality concerns along the Rio Grande basin.
Rio Grande Watermaster
In natural resource economics, economic theory considers optimal
use of renewable or nonrenewable resources. Optimal control theory yields
familiar results: the basic stock-flow equations that incorporate private and
social benefits and costs of resource use and the stock of that resource."
These results include evaluation of current and future use (sustainability)
as well as multiple types of users (municipal/industrial and agricultural,
third party, and instream ecological and environmental users). Theory is
silent on who or what agency would dictate these optimal control results,
but it is recognized that the market system alone would not achieve
optimal results unless all resource benefits and costs went through the
marketplace and water rights were well defined.
In a policy context, institutional control may provide an approxi-
mation to optimal control. The Rio Grande Watermaster office, adminis-
tered by the TNRCC, is charged with monitoring the use, allocating the
water, and enforcing those water rights laws and regulations established
by the Hidalgo decision and the Texas legislature. 2 Institutional control is
exhibited by the Rio Grande Watermaster (RGW) office through its
functions of accountability, operations, and enforcement, which are
important to the development of water markets along the Rio Grande.
The administrative offices of the RGW handle all accounts as to
individual water rights. A computerized monthly report indicates the
authorized water right (in acre-feet), any water use, and the water balance
of individual users to date. Irrigation water rights not used in a particular
year may be carried over as storage to the next year. Storage limits for
irrigation rights are approximately 1.41 times the annual water right.
Beyond that limit, the excess must be used, transferred or lost (the excess,
10. See Jean A. Bowman, The Rio Grande: A Confluence of Waters, Nations & Cultures 19 TEX.
WATER RESOURCES, Summer 1993, at 2.
11. See generally CKARLES HOWE, NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS: ISSUE, ANALYSM,
PoucY (1970).
12. See supra text accompanying note 2; Schoolmaster, supra note 7, at 296.
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not the water right). In addition, water rights may be subject to cancella-
tion if not used for a 10-year period.'3
The operations function of the RGW determines the available water
for all uses. This amount is based upon the flows of the Rio Grande,
climatic conditions, and water levels at the two lower Rio Grande
reservoirs (Falc6n and Amistad). Water to municipal rights, the highest
priority by statute, is allocated at the beginning of each year, with each
municipality receiving a credit for its pro rats share of annual water rights
to be distributed by the RGW. Municipalities thus have information as to
their annual water deliveries and can determine if shortfalls are imminent.
Water to irrigation users is decided on a monthly basis by the
RGW. A weekly report from the International Boundary and Water
Commission (IBWC), which monitors the provisions of the United
States-Mexico Water Treaty of 1944, provides information on storage levels
at Amistad and Falc6n reservoirs, average inflows and outflows and the
U.S. share of these three variables.'4
Users of all categories must request authorization to divert water.
Information required includes the owner name and certificate number,
when diversions from the Rio Grande are to begin and end, the rate of
diversion (gallons per minute or cubic feet per second), total acre-feet of
diversion request, and the pump number where diversion occurs. All
diversions are controlled through releases from the reservoir and surveil-
lance of diversion facilities.' s
Each user has an associated travel time from the reservoirs. For
example, the city of Brownsville is seven days downstream from Falc6n
reservoir. If water is requested on day one, it is received on day eight. Once
water diversions are ordered through the RGW, cancellation of an order
(i.e., if it rains) is costly, and 90 percent of the water ordered is still charged
to the account.
Enforcement of water use and water diversions is a responsibility
of the RGW as well. Water right balances and diversion requests are kept
at the RGW offices. Watermaster deputies check diversions along the Rio
Grande to ensure compliance with rules and regulations. There is little
evidence of non-authorized use.
In traditional economic terms, the Rio Grande Watermaster is able
to approximate an efficient water rights structure for United States' water
use along the Rio Grande. Water rights are (1) completely specified, (2)
13. See James E. Jonish et aL, Water Marketing Along the Texas Rio Grande, in PROC OF THE
UNnvSrrms COuNciL ON WATER REsOURCES ANNUAL MEETNG 170,171 (1996).
14. See Interviews with the Tex. Nat. Resources Conservation Comm'n, Rio Grande
Watermaster Office (Aug. 5-7,1993).
15. See id.
Spring 1999]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
benefits and costs are accrued to owners, (3) rights are transferable, and (4)
water rights are enforceable or secured from encroachment.
SPOT MARKET FOR WATER ALONG THE RIO GRANDE
In recent years, water transfers within Texas, and particularly
along the Rio Grande, have accelerated. Water institutions in Texas have
encouraged this development to a much greater extent than other western
and southwestern states.1' However, markets do still exist in these regions.
Saliba identified markets where permanent rights were being
transferred in New Mexico in the Gila-San Francisco Basin; in Arizona in
the Phoenix and Tucson Active Management Areas; in Colorado in the
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District; in Utah in the Lower
Sevier River Basin; and in Nevada in the Truckee River Basin.17 In the early
1990s the state of California instituted the California Drought Water Bank
(CDWB). This modified market was created to facilitate the transfer of
water from mainly agricultural interests to municipalities and industry.
Where the markets mentioned above differ from the Rio Grande is
in size, scope, and life. The spot market for water along the Rio Grande has
become a permanent fixture with numerous transactions each year. The
CDWB, in contrast, was only temporary, but it did involve a large number
of purchases without changing ownership of the water rights. The other
markets mentioned by Saliba were primarily permanent transfers of water.
Along the Rio Grande, the terms of water market transfers reflect
the broad-based characteristics of market exchange in general."' The
transfer may be permanent. This involves the exchange of water rights, with
or without associated land ownership, from one entity to another on a
permanent basis. The sale price represents the capitalized value of the
water right over time. A permanent transfer from one user to another user
class (irrigation to municipal) does require the approval of the TNRCC."9
The transfer may be on a term, or fixed period, basis. This type of contract
promises to deliver a certain quantity of water for a specified period of
time, up to one year. The contract price reflects the guaranteed delivery of
water per year at a fixed price for the specified period of years. Transfers
may be spot market transfers, a one-time exchange of a quantity of water
16. See generally Bonnie Colby, Economic Impacts of Water Law: State Law and Water Market
Development in the Southwest, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 721 (1988); Chan Chang & Ronald C.
Griffin, Water Marketing as a Reallocative Institution in Texas, 28 WATER RESOURCES RES. 879
(1992).
17. See Bonny Colby Saliba, Do Water Markets "Work"? Market Transfers and Trade-Offs in
the Southwestern States, 23 WATER RESOURCESRES. 1113 (1987).
18. See Jonish et al., supra note 13, at 172.
19. Texas Water Code Ann. § 11.122 (West 1998).
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from seller to buyer. Transfer price here should reflect prevailing condi-
tions (drought or abundance) at the time of transfer. Within the context of
TNRCC rules, these three different water transfer categories are considered
as two: permanent transfers of water and contracts for sale (covering term
and spot categories above).
Finally, option contracts in water markets are emerging. These are
contingency contracts with water deliveries based upon the occurrence of
a set of particular circumstances. This may involve general drought
contingencies and water reallocations, or excess demand sub-markets or
users, linked to excess supply sub-markets or users. The transfer price here
usually includes a fee to activate the option contract.
Far and above the most active market along the Rio Grande is the
spot market. Why is this market more active than the other transfer
possibilities? To answer this question it is necessary to compare the market
along the Rio Grande as it is with a theoretical market structure. The
characteristics of perfectly competitive markets include the following:
1. There are a number of firms, each producing a homogenous
product.
2. Each firm attempts to maximize profits.
3. Each firm is a price-taker; it assumes that its actions have no
effect on the market price.
4. Prices are assumed to be known by all market participants;
information is perfect.
5. Transactions are costless.2°
Examining the first characteristic of a perfectly competitive market
as it relates to the Rio Grande, the product in question is water. Spot
market water is perfectly homogenous in nature. Since the transaction is on
a one-time basis, no exchange of water rights takes place and therefore no
varying class of water rights is involved. Quality of water is assumed not
to have an impact on price because all buyers are drawing from the same
source at their point of diversion.
There are over 813 active water rights along the Rio Grande.
Therefore, there are a large number of potential buyers and sellers of spot
market water. Given that the geographic scope of the market encompasses
the Rio Grande from Amistad Reservoir to the Gulf of Mexico, along with
the number of potential participants, the market can be considered broad.
Holders of water rights are both individuals and firms. Over 80
percent of the water rights along the Lower Rio Grande are held in the
agricultural sector, with municipal, domestic and industrial users
20. See WALTER NICHOLsON, MICROEcONOMIC THEORY 427 (1992).
Spring 1999]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
accounting for the remaining share of water rights."1 It is assumed that each
sector engages in profit maximizing (utility maximizing) behavior.
The RGW is in a unique position to disseminate information
regarding water balances for individual entities. Since the RGW is required
to keep current water balances for each individual right holder and every
right holder is aware of this, individuals interested in purchasing water
know there is one location where information can be obtained, the RGW
office. Information is inexpensive (a phone call) and a search is relatively
costless. Any transaction costs that do exist (search, paperwork and
negotiations) are essentially fixed and low. The RGW office behaves like a
broker of water, bringing buyers and sellers together, but does not charge
a fee for these services.
Price is determined by negotiations between the buyer and seller
of the water and not by the RGW. This characteristic is important since it
allows for the price to fluctuate given changes in demand and supply. In
addition, a competitive market that sets a market-clearing price also
confronts the potential user with the true opportunity cost.'
One of the important characteristics of the RGW office is that it
monitors and enforces water rights effectively. Deputies continually patrol
along the river and canals making sure that right holders are in compliance
with regulations and no illegal pumping is taking place. This presence has
reduced the likelihood of cheating that could be done by anyone with the
means to capture the water.
During the dry summer of 1996, complaints were received by the
TNRCC that water which was purchased from upstream reservoirs never
reached its intended destination downstream. These complaints were
mainly focused in the Brazos, Lower Colorado, and Concho River Basins
where no watermaster program exists.' The protection of the water rights
by monitoring allows for the value of the right not to be eroded. It is
because the water holds value along the Rio Grande that an effective
market has developed.
It is the nature of the spot market and its characteristics that have
made it the most active water market along the Rio Grande. Since the
transfers are on a one time only basis, the water right holder has continued
ownership of that right. This might be a comforting aspect to right holders,
especially in a region where rainfall and water flows can change dramati-
cally from year to year and the majority of water rights holders are
21. See Chang & Griffin, supra note 16.
22. See Howe et al., supra note 1, at 440.
23. See TNRCC Water Resource Management, Surface Water Rights in Texas: How They
Work and What to Do When They Don't (visited Mar. 3,1997) <http://wwwtnrcc.state.tx.us/
admin/topdoc/gi/228>.
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agricultural interests. In addition, the ease at which water can transfer
hands in the spot market is advantageous. A permanent transfer would
require hearings and approvals by the TNRCC and therefore a lengthy
amount of time. A spot transfer can be made as quickly as in a day.
Market Activity
Although spot transactions for water along the Rio Grande have
existed for quite a while, records of these transactions have only been kept
since 1993. At this time the RGW office began to track a total of six
variables that could be attributed to each transaction. These were the date
of the transaction, buyer/seller, adjudication (permit) numbers, total acre-
feet purchased, price per acre-foot, and the class of the buyer (irrigation,
municipal, or mining).
Since the start of the record keeping in 1993 through August 31,
1998, there have been a total of 1,504 spot market transactions. Of this total,
the water in 1,274 of the transactions was put to use in irrigation, 119 were
for mining use, and 111 were for municipal use (see Table 1). Typically,
irrigators are sellers of water to all three user groups, probably stemming
from the fact that they are also the largest holders of water rights as a
group. However, there is some anecdotal evidence that individuals are
beginning to purchase permanent water rights for the sole purpose of
selling water in the spot market.
Table I
Spot Market Transactions Along the Rio Grande
Year Mining Municipal Irrigation Totals
1993 43 12 78 133
1994 23 30 156 209
1995 17 24 347 388
1996 12 17 291 320
1997 7 16 126 149
1998* 17 12 276 305
Totals 119 111 1274 1504
*998 transactions are through August 31. Source: Rio Grande Watermaster Office.
Also of interest is how the market has evolved between April 1993
and August 1998. Table 1 breaks down the number of total transactions on
a yearly basis and by user class. As the data in Table 1 show, the biggest
users and water rights holders, irrigators, are also the most active in the
spot market. Mining firms and municipalities participate but to a smaller
ISpring 19991
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degree. Market activity in 1998, a dry year, had already surpassed the
yearly total for 1997 by August 31.
Prices in the spot market for water are market determined. Even
though the RGW is responsible for allocating, monitoring and enforcing
water rights, the terms of the transfers, whether permanent or on a one-
time basis, are left up to the parties directly involved. Over the period of
the data the average price paid by irrigators was $16 per acre-foot,
municipalities paid on average $19 per acre-foot, and mining firms paid
$514 per acre-foot (see Table 2). The average size, along with prices, of the
transactions reveals important information about the market. Mining
interests engage in relatively small transactions with regard to the number
of acre-feet purchased (10) and pay on average 27 times more per acre-foot
than municipalities. As would be expected, municipalities purchase large
amounts of water, 546 acre-feet on average, to supplement their current
water supplies but pay little more than irrigators do. Thus, even in this well
functioning market, extremely large price differentials exist for a perfectly
homogenous commodity, contrary to the theory of perfect competition.'
Table 2
Price and Size of Spot Market Transactions
User Group Average Price (per acre foot) Averag Size (acre feet)
Irrigation $16 194
Mining 514 10
Municipality 19 546
Source: Rio Grnde Watemnaste Office
CONCLUSIONS
The experience of the spot market for water along the Rio Grande
in Texas is encouraging for individuals concerned with allocation and
management of this resource. The characteristics of this specific market
(well defined property rights that are enforced and transferable) have
allowed it to evolve into a substantial reallocation mechanism. The result
is that water is moving toward its highest valued use. Those individual
entities with an excess supply of water can sell that surplus without
24. The year of 1997 was a wet year across the Southwest and especially along the Rio
Grande, where rainfall totals were dose to the yearly average by September 15.
25. For a more detailed discussion of the price differentials see David W. Yoskowitz,
Analyses of Water Marketing and Allocation Mechanisms in Texas (1997) (unpublished
Doctoral dissertation, Tex. Tech Univ.) (on file with author); Jonish et al, supra note 13, at 173.
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changing the permanent nature of their right. This flexibility is an attractive
attribute since individuals with a surplus one year might find themselves
in need of their full allocation the next year. However, there is still room for
improvement in this active market. If it were to organize in a formal
fashion, this might help improve the quantity and quality of information,
reduce the price differentials, and give the market even more breadth.
Similar water markets exist in one form or another along other
rivers in the western United States. However, none is as extensive and
active as the Rio Grande spot market. For managers or river authorities
interested in developing a similar market, the key to success along the Rio
Grande has been rights that are well defined, enforceable, and transferable.
Enforcement is especially important, otherwise there is the opportunity for
"cheating" and therefore no incentive to purchase water through a market
mechanism. Secondly, enforcement will protect the value of the right.
